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LABOR POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Thomas A. Kochant
Stated simply, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) no longer
serves the purposes for which it was originally enacted. While historians
continue to debate the intent of the original framers of the Act, my reading
of its role was, and continues to be, that it is intended to provide workers
with a voice and representation on critical issues affecting their job; to
resolve, in an efficient and equitable fashion, conflicts occurring between
workers and employers; and to provide a process that enables workers and
employers to contribute to the performance of the economy and share
equitably in the fruits of their joint labors. Moreover, the Act served as the
central statute governing relations between workers and employers for
several decades following its enactment in 1935, it is now only one of
many laws and regulations governing specific employment rights and
issues. Similarly, while collective bargaining was once envisioned as the
preferred option for workers seeking a collective voice on issues of
concern to them, in practice, it now competes with or is complemented by
a variety of other informal and formal participatory and representational
processes. Therefore, any efforts to reform this statute must consider its
interrelationships with and appropriate role in the broader spectrum of
employment law and practice.
Thus, in this essay, I will focus on what I believe is the central
question facing labor policy today: which labor and employment policy
and enforcement processes are best suited to meet these objectives as we
look forward to entering the twenty-first century?
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I. THE BASIC PROBLEMS'
To solve the NLRA's underlying problems requires that we face
squarely and honestly the enormous gap between the assumptions of the
original law and current workplace realities and practices. This gap holds
both negative and positive lessons. It documents both the problems parties
experience with the law and the innovations introduced in some of
America's best workplaces in recent years, innovations that I believe
provide the basis for a fundamentally new labor and employment policy
that empowers workers and employers to take responsibility for governing
their relationships in ways that suit their needs and circumstances.
The mismatch between the law and current practices is evident in
several ways.
1. The law no longer delivers on the promise that workers will
have the opportunity to choose whether or not to be represented
by a union on their job. Instead, the process governing
representation has been transformed into a high risk, highly
conflictive legal battle between employers and unions. Any
employer seeking to defeat a union organizing drive can do so
by resisting aggressively through legal or illegal means,
stringing out the process through various appeals, and, if
necessary, stonewalling the union in the negotiation of a first
contract or threatening to hire replacement workers. Yet, for
more than twenty years, surveys have shown that approximately
one out of three nonunion workers would prefer to be
represented by the union if given the chance.
Moreover, the law provides oniy a single form of
representation focused around a constrained set of issues while a
strong majority of today's work force is calling for more varied
forms of participation, voice, and representation which were not
anticipated by the framers of the NLRA. Again, surveys have
documented that the majority of American workers today want
to participate directly in decisions that affect both their
immediate and long-term economic interests and in decisions
that influence how their work is structured and how their efforts
contribute to the goals of their enterprise and their profession.
Moreover, while workers want to have a voice in selecting who
1. The material in this section draws heavily on the evidence presented in
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR &
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1994 FACT FINDING REPORT 63-65 [hereinafter FACT FINDING
REPORT]. While I recognize that the Commission's recommendations are controversial, I
believe that the facts contained in the Commission's first report will need to be taken into
account in any future efforts to modernize labor and employment law.
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will represent them in these processes, they also want and expect
managers to cooperate and support, rather than oppose, these
efforts.2 Thus, the law effectively denies the majority of today's
workers access to the different forms of representation they want
in their jobs.
2. The law no longer works for modem employers either,
especially those who seek to compete by involving their work
force in cooperative efforts to improve the performance of their
enterprise. These employers must draw on workers' knowledge
by decentralizing decision making to front-line workers and
involving employees in a continuous search for ways to improve
productivity, quality, and customer service. This requires
breaking down traditional lines of demarcation between workers
and supervisors or managers drawn in the law. Indeed, a
significant number of employers have ignored the law and are
introducing these changes in their organizations. Unfortunately,
since these needs were not anticipated in the 1930s when the
NLRA was enacted, they are discouraged and inhibited by
current law and its interpretation by the National Labor
Relations Board interpretations and the courts in both nonunion
and union settings. It is very poor public policy to retain
doctrines that require the best of our employers (and unions) to
violate the law by doing what is in the best interests of the
economy and the work force! The effect can only be for the law
to fall into further disrepute and, at worst, to constrain the
diffusion of practices that are in the mutual interest of
employers, employees, and the overall economy.
3. Collective bargaining is no longer the forum where the
issues creating many of the conflicts occurring in today's
workplace are addressed or resolved. There are two reasons for
this. First, unions represent only a small fraction of the work
force, and second, collective bargaining contracts and
administrative processes address only a subset of the problems
and conflicts that arise in workplaces today. Instead, this
conflict resolution role has been ceded to the array of
employment statutes and regulations enacted since the 1960s
2. See the results of the Worker Representation and Participation Survey directed by
Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers and conducted by the Princeton Survey Research
Associates as summarized in the Appendix to CoMMESSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FiNAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 63-65 (1994)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
1998]
U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 1:1
that apply to all workers regardless of whether they are covered
by a bargaining agreement. However, these employment laws
and regulations have become so complex and expansive that
they have exceeded the capacity of government agencies to
enforce them. They also impose tremendous burdens on
employers faced with the task of compliance. Finally, they fail
to provide effective justice to many of the workers most at risk
of being victims.
Unlike the NLRA, these statutes lack the functional
equivalent of the NLRB and private arbitration, through which a
body of common law and "common law of the shop" evolved
progressively to guide and shape workplace practices. As a
result, we have experienced a 400% increase in federal lawsuits
between 1971 and 1991, a backlog of over 100,000 cases at the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and continuous
declines in staffing levels of Department of Labor enforcement
agencies. There is growing agreement on the need to find an
alternative to the rigid "command and control" regimes used to
enforce these policies. Mediation and arbitration tools initially
developed under collective bargaining, along with newer
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, may serve as
viable alternatives. However, we have not yet determined how
to incorporate these techniques into an alternative system for
delivering workplace justice and resolving the conflicts
occurring in today's workplaces.
4. The implicit model of the employment relationship that
underlies much of labor and employment law and regulation no
longer accommodates an increasing number of today's workers
or firms. The standard image of employment is one of an
ongoing relationship between a full-time career employee and a
single employer responsible for complying with all workplace
laws and providing a broad range of fringe benefits and training
opportunities. The increased diversity of the work force, growth
of contingent work, outsourcing of work not central to the core
mission or competencies of the firm, and increased demand for
flexibility in working hours and career patterns all make it more
difficult to assign these responsibilities to a single firm.
Reforms of labor and employment laws must therefore take into
account the diverse nature of the work force, the range of
employment relationships, and the shared and ambiguous locus
of traditional managerial responsibilities found in the modem
economy.
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II. PRINCIPLES FOR A MODERN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY
The scope and magnitude of these problems suggest that minor
tinkering with the law or incremental adjustments dealing with particular
problems will not sufficeNor will efforts to modify the NLRA without
regard to developments in current workplace practices or to the problems
facing other areas of employment law and regulation. Finally, any reform
effort should take advantage of the opportunity to privatize responsibilities
for enforcing and adapting employment laws by drawing on the innovative
capacities and potential found in many of today's employment
relationships.
Thus, I suggest three principles to guide efforts to update and
modernize labor and employment law. We need to (1) take a
comprehensive approach, (2) encourage development of private self-
governance processes to adapt the law to different settings, and (3)
promote experimentation with new institutional arrangements that allow us
to learn as we go.
A. Taking a Comprehensive Approach to Updating Employment Law
The problems summarized above are not only serious and critical, but
also highly interrelated. They cannot be addressed through piecemeal,
incremental reforms of one part of the NLRA, nor by responding to the
concerns of workers or employers while ignoring the legitimate problems
of the other. Moreover, we must recognize the futility of trying to reform
labor law in isolation from the broad range of laws and regulations that
apply to all workers, not just those covered or seeking to be covered by
collective bargaining. Labor law reforms must be seen as part of the larger
task of restructuring the entire body of employment law and regulations in
ways that are better suited to today's diverse work force and employment
arrangements. The concluding comments of the Fact Finding Report are
worth repeating here because I believe they outline the essential challenges
and opportunities before us:
A diverse workforce requires variation in methods and
procedures for employee participation, representation, and
dispute resolution. Sustained labor-management cooperation
requires acceptance of labor representatives as valued partners in
existing work sites under collective bargaining and respect for
workers' rights to choose whether or not to be represented in
new facilities. Cooperation cannot be sustained in an
environment of bitter, prolonged, and inflammatory debates over
the process of worker representation. Collective bargaining
relationships that follow long battles over union recognition
cannot be easily transformed into cooperative and highly
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participative workplaces.
Alternative dispute resolution procedures cannot take on a
broader role in enforcing workplace justice unless the parties
affected participate in both the design and oversight of the
system.
The issues and the parties... no longer fit the traditional labels
of "worker" versus "supervisor" or "manager," or "exempt"
versus "nonexempt." The issues of concern in the modem
workplace transcend those covered by a traditional collective
bargaining contract. Thus, participation in the design and
oversight of workplace dispute resolution must also transcend
these traditional labels and boundaries between employee
groups.
The success of any formal dispute resolution system requires
effective workplace policies and institutions that both prevent
problems from arising in the first place and resolve as many as
possible informally before they escalate into formal complaints
or lawsuits .... Workplaces that have been successful in
developing the trust needed to foster and sustain employee
participation and cooperation are more likely to have these types
of policies and the capability to resolve those problems that do
arise. The question is whether it is possible to take advantage of
existing labor-management relationships and employee
participation processes to fulfill some of these workplace justice
roles.3
These interdependent features of contemporary labor policy challenge
us to see the problems in their full dimension and to fashion a
comprehensive alternative, rather than a piecemeal approach.
B. Encouraging Development of Self-Governing Workplaces
Many of our most functional employment relationships have practices
in place that, if used to their full advantage, are capable of addressing
many of these interrelated problems. We should both learn from and take
advantage of the "best practices" that already exist in some of America's
workplaces. By doing so, we can replace the rigid "command and control"
approach to enforcement with one that encourages self-governance and
development of private dispute resolution systems that are more efficient,
flexible, speedy, and just. However, to do so will require that we
differentiate between those innovative employers and workers that have
the capacity to take on self-governance responsibilities and those that lack
3. FAcT FINDING REPORT, supra note 1, at 140.
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these capabilities and, therefore, require an updated but more traditional
form of regulation, protection, and enforcement.
Thus, I propose we create a "Two-Track" labor and employment
policy. One track would apply to those employment relationships that
demonstrate they have in place the types of participative, dispute
resolution, and representational structures and processes that would allow
them to internalize responsibility for enforcing and applying a broad range
of laws and regulations governing employment relations. The second
track, applicable to those employment relationships lacking these internal
responsibility capabilities, would be governed by traditional methods of
enforcement and adjudication of alleged infractions of laws or regulations.
A primary objective of national policy should then be to promote the
development and broader diffusion among employees and employers and
their organizations of the capabilities needed to internalize responsibility
for enforcing employment law and for adapting regulations to fit their
particular circumstances. Those employers and employees with effective
self-governance systems should be granted greater flexibility in how they
meet the goals and standards contained in various employment regulations.
C. Supporting Experimentation and Learning
These new principles require considerable institutional innovation,
especially if they are to address the needs of those workers who are not
employed full-time for an extended period by a single employer at a fixed
work site. Unions and/or other associations need to develop the strategies
and capabilities to represent workers as they want to be represented.
Government enforcement agencies, neutrals, the courts, and the parties to
employment disputes all need to develop fair procedures for resolving
disputes privately. Employers need to create workplace environments and
policies that win and sustain the trust and support of employees and add
economic value to the enterprise. These efforts will require a process of
experimentation and learning. Fostering this experimental learning
process should be an explicit goal and high priority of labor policy makers
and administrators.
UI. IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES: A TwO-TRACK PROPOSAL
Principles are fine; however, as with any policy, the action (or the
devil) is in the details. Therefore, I want to outline here a set of specific
legislative and administrative actions that would put these principles to
work and begin the testing and learning process. The basic proposal is to
create a flexible self-governance option for adapting and internalizing
enforcement of workplace laws and regulations that would be available for
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those employers and employees that have instituted state-of-the-art
employee participation practices and dispute resolution systems. This self-
governance option would be built on the foundation of other necessary
reforms to labor and employment law that would apply to all employment
relationships. However, participants of the self-governance option would
be encouraged to meet some of their legal requirements through practices
adapted to fit their particular circumstances that produce equivalent or
better results.
A. The Self-Governance Option
The self-governance option would provide a simple, non-litigious
way of promoting fair dispute resolution systems for enforcing legal rights
while encouraging further expansion of broad-ranging employee
participation processes. It would work as follows:
1. Employers and employees that have in place an employee
participation process and a fair dispute resolution process would
be allowed to resolve alleged legal violations through private
mediation and arbitration. They could meet the requirements of
workplace laws with "equivalent practices or standards" that are
adapted to meet their specific situation, but are at least equal to
or better than the standard or requirements contained in the law.
Employees could appeal to the arbitration process and the
relevant agency if they believe a local practice does not meet the
"equivalency" test. The relevant government agency should be
responsible for reviewing whether the decisions of private
arbitrators conform with existing law and meet the equivalency
standard, just as the NLRB currently does under the Spielberg
doctrine.
2. NLRA provisions limiting employee participation would be
waived in employment relationships that have in place fair
procedures that meet the tests of due process for resolving
disputes involving workers' legal rights.4 This means that
employee participation processes could expand into any legally
protected or regulated issue if a fair dispute resolution process,
including arbitration by a neutral, is available to employees for
appealing claims that their legal rights have been violated.
4. The Commission's Final Report outlined a set of quality standards that would meet
these requirements. More recently, a group of respected neutrals and organizations have
developed a "Protocol" for formal dispute resolution procedures that incorporate these
quality standards. See A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory
Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at D-
34 (May 11, 1995).
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3. Minimum standards for the employee participation process
should be included in the law providing for:
a. prohibition of discrimination for exercising rights to
participation and representation;
b. information disclosure, training, and access to outside
expertise that is needed for effective employee participation
and consultation;
c. employee voice in selecting their representatives on
committees or other groups charged with adapting
workplace laws and regulations or overseeing
administration of the dispute resolution system; and
d. involvement of union representatives if some or all of
the employees involved are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement.
4. The employer would have the burden of establishing the
procedures required to meet these standards. Consequently, the
standards would be enforced by exception, i.e., employees would
have the right to file a complaint or appeal if they believe that
either their individual rights have been violated or that the
minimum standards are not being met. The advantage of this
approach is that it avoids creating a new bureaucracy to handle
debates and litigation over the initial "certification" of any
participation or dispute resolution plan in the abstract before it is
tried and tested in practice. Instead, it allows the parties to learn
as they go along and, through arbitration, to develop the modem
day equivalent of the "common law of the shop" that grievance
arbitration has provided to collective bargaining over the years.
5. Employees would have the right to be represented as
individuals in workplace matters and, in these dispute resolution
systems, by any individual or organization of their choosing.
B. Updating the Standard Provisions in Labor and Employment Law
None of the above features of the self-governance option is feasible
unless the laws governing union representation and collective bargaining
are updated to support these new participatory and representational forums
and revised in ways that allow employees to choose freely, in a non-hostile
environment, whether or not they wish to be represented by a union or
some other organization and the form of participation and representation,
including collective bargaining, best suited to their circumstances.
Specifically:
19981
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1. The current law governing representation elections would
be modified to promote orderly and prompt election processes
and to insure that once employees vote to be represented for
purposes of collective bargaining, the parties successfully reach
a first contract expeditiously and also establish an efficient and
cooperative bargaining relationship. In practice, this entails a
combination of statutory and administrative changes to:
a. reduce delays in holding and certifying election
results;
b. increase the incentive to comply with the law by
stiffening penalties for violations and providing injunctive
relief where appropriate; and
c. provide alternative dispute resolution assistance to the
parties as soon as a union is certified (e.g., interest-based
bargaining, mediation, and, where appropriate, one of a
variety of forms of arbitration). By joint agreement, the
parties could decline any or all of these forms of assistance
in dispute resolution, or could design their own system.
2. These standard provisions also would apply to firms and
employees participating in the self-governance option.
Moreover, eligibility for the self-governance option would be
forfeited if an employer violates the standard provisions
governing the representation elections or first contract
negotiations process. However, under the self-governance
option, these provisions would be enforced through the
arbitration system in the same fashion as other workplace laws.
As in other areas, the parties also would be encouraged to
establish their own equivalent standard procedures to govern any
future union organizing drive that might occur.
3. Those employment relationships that do not participate in
the self-governance option, or that fail to meet the minimum
standards required for that option, would continue to be subject
to the provisions of section 8(a)(2) as interpreted by the NLRB.
IV. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
This brief outline of a "Two-Track" labor policy obviously raises
many questions. Some of the most obvious are discussed below.
Is it too easy for an employer to "control" employee participation under
the self-governance option?
Employers obtain relief from section 8(a)(2) limitations under this
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arrangement even though the employee participation process is clearly
"employer dominated" by traditional definitions of this term. However,
the employer continues to carry the burden of meeting the minimum
standards specified for these processes. By adopting this approach, we are
essentially recognizing the reality of nearly all workplace relationships and
legal responsibilities. Employers initiate policies and then are held
accountable for meeting accepted standards for their design and
administration.
How does it "solve" the section 8(a)(2) problem?
It creates an avenue for progressive employers to solve the section
8(a)(2) problem for themselves by choosing the self-governance option.
This avoids the need to try to write new and equally futile language into
the law that would attempt to distinguish between "exempt" and
"nonexempt" personnel or "supervisors" and "employees," or between
issues of interest to "employers" and issues involving "wages, hours, and
working conditions."
We retain the protections of section 8(a)(2) in those relationships
characterized by more traditional management methods, and let the NLRB
handle the few issues likely to arise in these relationships on a case-by-
case basis.
Would it reduce or increase opportunities for unions to organize workers?
Under this arrangement, unions and/or other professional associations
would have at least three options for recruiting members. In turn, workers
would have three models of representation from which to choose:
a. Under a self-governance option plan, unions and other
organizations could market their services (e.g., technical advice,
etc.) to individual workers and also represent individuals in
complaints and dispute resolution processes where no bargaining
relationship exists.
b. Unions could provide the individual services described
above and also provide collective bargaining representation in
settings where a majority of employees want not only the
consultative and dispute resolution rights provided by a
voluntary plan, but also the right to bargain over wages, benefits,
and other conditions of employment.
c. Unions could provide collective bargaining representation
to employees in settings where no self-governance plan is in
place, and could then propose development of a plan as a
supplement to their collective bargaining representation. This
model would be appropriate for employees faced with a
relatively traditional employer that has not adopted an ADR or
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employee participation-based human resource strategy.
How do we insure that employees' rights to choose whether or not to be
represented are not further reduced by these arrangements?
This concern can only be addressed if we combine the self-
governance plan with necessary labor law reforms that protect employee
rights, and if the arbitrators are empowered to rule on individual or group
claims that employee statutory rights are being violated.
How do we insure that the arbitrators are experts in the appropriate
subjects, reflect the demographic make-up of the relevant employee
population, are not controlled by the employer, and do not simply
reinforce existing power imbalances in the employment relationship?
These concerns would need to be addressed by developing a cadre of
trained arbitrators and other neutrals who reflect the demography of the
work force and by making their selection in specific cases (or the choice of
a permanent umpire) a joint process between the employer and the
claimant and his or her representative. The task force that developed the
"Protocol" is now working with the American Bar Association, the
American Arbitration Association, and other organizations to develop a
program to train arbitrators in the relevant statutes and due process
procedures.
How do we avoid a multiplicity of collective bargaining representatives?
"Minority" representation would be only for individuals. Collective
representation would remain only for collective bargaining based on
majority status.
How do we avoid long bureaucratic delays and rigid bureaucratic
oversight of the plan?
We rely on the arbitration process to enforce the plan with oversight
and minimal scope of review by the government agency responsible for the
relevant law. This avoids the need for debates over elections or for an
agency decision on whether or not to "certify" the initial plan before it is
tested in action. The employer and employees have the incentive to design
and implement a plan that meets the requirements in the law.
Consequently, individuals can challenge the plan through arbitration if
they believe their rights have been violated or the plan does not meet the
requirements. Over time, the published arbitrators' decisions will lead to a
new "common law of the workplace" for others to learn from and adapt.
The range of remedies available to the arbitrator would allow the plan to
be modified and improved as experience is gained. Revocation of the plan
is reserved for only the most serious or repeated violations of the minimum
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standards, or of individual rights under the law.
How do employers gain flexibility to adapt workplace regulations to fit
their particular settings?
This is accomplished by having an "equivalent standard" provision in
the law that would allow employers (enforced by arbitrators) to follow
practices that depart from the general regulations, provided they offer
equivalent, if not greater, protections to employees. This would be an
important incentive for employers to develop a voluntary plan and
participate in this option.
How do these proposals deal with the problems of contingent employees
and other "non-standard" employment relationships?
This is perhaps the most difficult challenge facing employment policy
makers today. The range of employment relationships and problems are so
varied and rapidly changing that any effort to write uniform rules applying
to all settings is futile. Instead of uniform rules, I believe there is a need
for organizations that can provide representational and labor market
services for workers not tied to a specific employer or work site. This has
been one of the historic functions of craft or professional unions. The
legislative and administrative reforms proposed here provide both the
opportunities and the incentives for unions and/or other organizations to
meet this need.
V. WHO BENEFITS?
Any comprehensive reform of labor policy must serve the interests of
workers, their representatives, employers, and a society eager to reduce the
costs and burdens of government. The approach outlined above would
provide considerable benefits to each of these parties. Specifically, the
benefits to employers would include:
1. flexibility to establish employee participation
processes and to address whatever issues are relevant to
improving the competitiveness and quality of relations at
the workplace;
2. flexibility to develop equivalent practices to comply
with workplace laws and regulations that fit their specific
setting, as long as these practices do not reduce employee
rights and employees have a voice in the development of
the equivalent practices; and
3. a private dispute resolution process that can resolve
employment claims, subject to limited rights of appeal or
review by the government enforcement agency and the
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courts, that is cheaper to administer, involves arbitrators
with expertise on the relevant issues, and avoids costly and
unpredictable jury awards.
Employees would benefit from:
1. increased participation and representation with a
quick, low cost, and private system for resolving disputes
over their legal rights at the workplace;
2. the right to be represented in statutory dispute
resolution proceedings by any individual or organization of
their choosing;
3. effective and low cost access to the right to organize
for purposes of collective bargaining, should this suit their
needs and circumstances; and
4. effective access for employees of all income levels to
a fair system for enforcing their legal rights in which they
select their representatives and participate in selecting the
arbitrator.
Unions would benefit from:
1. opportunities to recruit and represent workers in a
variety of ways;
2. a more effective way of resolving disputes over union
organizing; and
3. an opportunity to obtain binding decisions on disputes
involving their members' legal rights. This opportunity is
currently precluded under the Gardner-Denver doctrine.
Government and society would benefit from:
1. reduced caseloads and regulatory burdens, and broad
application of private dispute resolution processes to
resolve workplace issues;
2. diffusion and continuity of broad forms of employee
participation and labor-management cooperation that hold
the most promise of achieving significant economic and
social benefits;
3. less conflict in processes for deciding worker
representation issues;
4. reduced costs of regulation and litigation, since the
parties, rather than the government, would bear the costs of
resolving employment disputes; and
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5. the ability to focus scarce regulatory resources on the
most egregious violators.
VI. GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE
I realize that the policy outlined here is wholly inconsistent with the
politics of the day. The current political reality is such that it is nearly
impossible to sustain a serious discussion of labor policy issues in
Washington. Thus, I do not expect that these ideas will produce the
necessary legislative action to implement them in the foreseeable future,
given the partisan and surreal nature of current debates over labor policy.
However, precisely because there is little prospect for breaking the
political stalemate over labor policy at this juncture, professionals in this
field need to focus on the facts before them and to work on solutions to the
root causes of our problems, rather than spar over their symptoms.
However, we also need to be practical and take advantage of the
opportunities for opening up labor law to the period of experimentation
needed to test new ideas. Indeed, some experimentation is underway. The
Occupational Health and Safety Administration has announced new rules
that would allow experimentation with a form of self-governance similar
to the ideas proposed here. Other agencies of the Department of Labor, the
EEOC, and state agencies, such as the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, also are experimenting with the use of private dispute
resolution. We need to track and learn from these experiments, as well as
from the broad range of innovative practices that various companies,
unions, and workers have implemented in their work sites. In the end, our
national policies can only be as good as the best practice models upon
which they are based. Ultimately, it is out of these experiments and
innovations that the foundation will be laid for a labor policy that works
for the work force and economy of the twenty-first century.
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